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Abstract 
A key question facing regulators is how to create an economic environment that encourages 
appropriate investment and innovation. In this paper we analyze the importance of 
technological change for both competition and regulation, with a particular focus on the 
regulation of telecommunications and the Internet. We recommend that dynamic efficiency 
should be used as the appropriate benchmark for judging the effectiveness of different 
regulatory approaches. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that incentive regulation, 
such as price caps, is not particularly good at promoting dynamic efficiency. Neither is 
traditional cost-of-service regulation. As an alternative, we suggested that antitrust, 
judiciously applied, is likely to be better at promoting dynamic efficiency.  
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Regulating Dynamic Markets: 
Progress in Theory and Practice 
Lewis Evans and Robert Hahn 
1. Introduction  
Rapid technological change acts as a competitive force over time. Markets characterised by 
high rates of innovation fit Schumpeter’s (1942) process of “creative destruction”, whereby 
competition occurs through more efficient firms entering the market and displacing existing 
technologies or less efficient firms.  It is an evolutionary process that is Darwinian in nature 
through the survival of the fittest, where over time relatively “weaker” technologies, firms, 
and production processes are replaced by relatively “stronger” substitutes.  In these markets, 
innovation, new technologies, and cost reductions have similar implications for incumbent 
firms to contestable entry, while the associated stranding of existing technologies is a form of 
exit.  In addition, rapid technological change inhibits affiliated actions among incumbents.1  
Dynamic technological change is therefore part of competition. 
For many modern-economy products competitive effects may be tempered with the influence 
of network effects associated with connectivity.  However, competition may also be enhanced 
because first mover advantage in these products is valuable and network effects thus 
engender tournament competition that is all the more intense because of the rapidity of 
change.  The consequence of network effects is that there is a tendency for a market to “tip” 
to a single dominant product, technology or standard.2  In modern economies the 
contemporary, almost instant, availability of geographically separate but deep and connected 
markets also enhances the vigor of competition; as compared to the past where innovations 
recovered their cost over time in a limited array of horizontally segmented markets.3  
These features of technical change characterise telecommunications4 and explain why it has 
been at the forefront in the evolution of regulatory arrangements. In the 1970s the advent of 
competition arising from new technology was an important force in the breakdown of cost-
                                                 
1  Kaplow and Shapiro (2007) argue that the more likely it is that a market will experience a disruptive 
technological innovation, the harder it is to sustain collusion.   
2  See for example, Katz and Shapiro (1998). could also cite: Shapiro and Varian  - Information Rules 
LE/NERA 
3  The almost instant worldwide diffusion of 1G, 2G and 3G mobile telecommunications technologies (Gruber 
(2005)) – need cite at end is a good example of rapid horizontal diffusion of technology in the modern 
world. 
4  Technical change in telecommunications is described in the Appendix. 
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of-service regulation that explicitly prevented entry in the USA since 1934 (Hausman, Tardiff 
and Belinfante (1993)). This entry-limiting cost-of-service regulation inhibited the uptake of 
technological advancements and produced inefficient pricing. At least from the break up of 
American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) in 1984, industry-specific regulation in the U.S. 
used incentive regulation that enabled entry.5 The switch to industry-specific incentive 
regulation, such as price or revenue caps set in advance, was widespread in other industries 
and in other countries in the closing three decades of the 20th century.6  
Regulation of (near) natural monopoly industries evolved during this period from state-
ownership and cost-of-service regulation,7 to more private ownership and incentive 
regulation.8 Since that time much has been learned about the theory and practice of incentive 
regulation. This learning has entailed developments in the political economy of regulation 
and it has been informed by developments in the application of modern finance to regulation. 
This application is especially germane because it incorporates decision-making under 
uncertainty9, and because the switch from entry-limited cost-of-service regulation to 
incentive regulation shifts competitive and technological risks away from consumers to the 
firm. Modern investment theory combined with the theory of regulation helps to explain why 
incentive regulation has, as traditionally implemented, not performed well. It also provides 
lessons for improved approaches to regulation.  
A key issue addressed in this paper is the optimal form of regulation in a dynamically 
evolving industry, such as telecommunications. We argue, contrary to conventional wisdom, 
that incentive regulation is not particularly good at promoting dynamic efficiency; nor is 
traditional cost-of-service regulation. As an alternative, we suggest that antitrust, judiciously 
applied, is likely to be better at promoting such efficiency.  
                                                 
5  Competition continued to be managed however: Shin and Ying (1992) illustrate this in its analysis of 1980s 
mobile phone regulation that limited entry across states beyond duopoly. 
6  The industries included Transport, Energy, Communications and Finance, and occurred in varying degrees 
across most countries of the OECD (Littlechild (2003)). 
7  We use the term rate-of-return regulation interchangeably with cost-of-service regulation. 
8  The key distinguishing principle of incentive regulation is that it seeks to set regulatory parameters – e.g. 
price caps – on the basis of factors that are independent of the firm and in this way assign the firm 
autonomy to maximize profits against these parameters without there being feedback to the setting of 
parameters.  Such feedback engenders a game between the regulator and the firm that is likely to cost 
efficiency. In general regulatory practice the ideal of incentive regulation has been compromised as (near) 
monopoly industries typically hold much of the information about that industry, and because regulators and 
regulated firms necessarily interact among each other in industry-specific regulation. An implication of 
incentive regulation is that firms subject to increasing autonomy under regulation carry more industry risk 
than they would under cost-of-service regulation.    
9  We do not distinguish between risk and uncertainty. 
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Section 2 of the paper examines the basis of dynamic efficiency and what the theory of 
regulation predicts for regulating dynamic markets. Section 3 examines variations in 
telecommunications regulation across countries, and their effects. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Regulation for dynamic efficiency in dynamic markets 
2.1. The Dynamic Efficiency Framework 
Dynamic efficiency is widely accepted as the appropriate criterion for market regulation.10 
Dynamic efficiency can be measured as “the outcomes from the sequence of future decision-
making relating to the allocation of resources, production technologies of firms, and 
investment in new knowledge”.11  It is intrinsically related to efficiency in the process of 
innovation and encompasses all its pertinent dimensions (Baumol (2002, p.30, footnote 1))  – 
for example, the processes of invention and of successive improvement before introduction, 
as well as the act of introduction itself. It is distinguished from static (allocative and 
productive)12 efficiency by its emphasis on factors that affect future welfare, such as 
investment and innovation.  
To examine the linkages between regulation and welfare it is useful to set out quite precisely 
the generic connection between static and dynamic efficiency. We introduce a definition of 
dynamic efficiency that is both flexible and firmly grounded in traditional welfare economics. 
It is flexible in the sense that it includes uncertainty, and allows changes in technology and 
demand over time. It is firmly grounded and tightly linked to conventional cost-benefit 
analysis in that it builds on the idea of static efficiency and extends that idea across time, 
allowing for investment and innovation. We will use this formulation to show why some 
approaches to regulation are likely to be suboptimal in certain settings. Static efficiency at 
date t is conventionally measured as the sum of producers’ and consumers’ surplus (i.e. total 
surplus) for the relevant market at that date. It is affected by the factors affecting supply and 
demand up to and in time t, including regulatory settings. It is static welfare that is total 
surplus we denote Wt(pt,θ ) where p symbolizes market price, and θ  contains relevant 
                                                 
10  Dynamic efficiency is accepted by the OECD as the basis for policy assessment: see Ahn (2002, s.1) for an 
example.  
11  Evans, Quigley and Zhang (2000), p.2. 
12  A market at a point in time is statically efficient if it is allocatively and productively efficient, which holds 
if the level of output in that market and supply costs are such that the total surplus at that time is at a 
maximum.    
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regulatory policy settings.  For example, θ  may include a cap on the level of the price, in 
which case pt and Wt will reflect the effect of the cap.  
Wt(pt,θ ) is a snapshot of the consumer plus producer surplus of a market at a point in time, in 
the next point of time it will be Wt+1(pt+1,θ ). The difference between the W’s of the two dates 
will reflect a) technology change (supply curve) b) demand change (demand curve) and c) 
investment. At each time W reflects investment and innovation decisions of the past. If prices 
are held too low in period t (and are expected to be low in the future) there will be reduced 
investment/innovation and the value of W in future periods will be lower.  
Dynamic efficiency is the sum of total surplus generated by the market over time, and it is 
expressed as the expected present value of the market’s total surplus into the indefinite 
future.13 Dynamic efficiency can be represented looking forward from the present (t =0) as:   
 
DE0 = E0( Wt (pt ,θ)(1+ r)t | I0,t= 0
∞∑  σ,  θ)                             (1.1)
       =Wt (pt ,θ) + E0( Wt (pt ,θ)(1+ r)t | I0,t=1
∞∑  σ,  θ)            (1.2)
 
where DE0 DE t = 0 is dynamic efficiency of the indefinite future assessed at the present time (i.e. 
when t=0), E0(. | I0,σ,θ) is the expectation of the future based upon information at t=0. The 
term I denotes relevant market specific information including technology, σ  represents 
variation in prospective outcomes arising from technological and all other sources of market 
uncertainty, and the regulatory policy settings are summarised in θ ; all available at the date 
from which expectations of the future are taken. The term r is the relevant social discount 
rate. The variance and policy settings are available at the present time, but may be anticipated 
to change over time. Both (1.1) and (1.2) describe dynamic efficiency, but (1.2) expresses it 
as the sum of immediate total surplus plus the present value of the total surpluses (dynamic 
efficiency) expected to occur in the future.14 We shall assume that this immediate total 
surplus, as well as later surpluses, may be manipulated by regulation, at date t=0 by settings 
of the policy parameters of θ 0 . Whereas the social planner seeks to maximise dynamic 
                                                 
13  We take the view that dynamic efficiency as expressed in (1) is the appropriate goal for regulation of 
industry; and that equity considerations should be left to other policy instruments. Regulation is a very 
clumsy tool for effecting income re-distribution for reasons that include identification of the incidence of 
regulatory interventions. Without understanding the incidence the equity cannot be linked to welfare. While 
incidence is problematic enough in a static world it is impossible to assess in a dynamic setting. These 
issues are discussed in the context of antitrust and regulation by Evans (2004) and Katz (2004). 
14  Note that cost-benefit analysis typically has the same objective as dynamic efficiency. 
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efficiency, the regulated firm has the same inter-temporal structure for its objective but with 
total surplus replaced by profit and with the social discount rate replaced by their private 
discount rate. 
To maximise dynamic efficiency by regulation requires choosing the policy settings that 
make the weighted sum of (1.1) as large as possible. It entails choosing policies that 
anticipate effects of policies on present and future total surpluses. There is generally a trade-
off between future and present total surpluses. Future surpluses are affected by investment, 
innovation and the utilisation of innovation, while maximising immediate welfare W0(p0,θ0) 
typically entails regulating firm behaviour in ways that restrict investment and innovation, 
and thereby future total surpluses.  The goal of price regulation in this setting is to increase 
dynamic efficiency by first affecting the level of immediate total surplus, W0(p0,θ0)), and 
secondly investment and innovation that increases total surplus in later periods. The second 
dynamic effect will not, in general, be adequately addressed under pure monopoly because 
the monopolist gains just the incremental profit from innovation and investment whereas 
society has the higher payoff of gains in total surplus.  However, the effect of price controls 
on future surpluses is also problematic because pure monopoly is rare and regulation tends to 
place a greater emphasis on current, relative to future, total surplus. Furthermore, the effect of 
setting a price too low will typically have a more pronounced effect on total welfare than 
setting a price too high, because setting a price too low will suppress efficient innovation. 
It is apparent from (1) that restricting future total surpluses may be very socially costly, in 
absolute terms as well as relative to effects on static efficiency. Regulation that delays 
investment and innovation may delay beneficial effects on future surpluses that can arise 
from such things as lower costs and new products. It is clear from (1) that regulation that 
induces missing markets as would occur when a socially viable product is not introduced 
implies that the total surplus from that market is absent for all periods. More commonly, 
where there is delay induced by regulation the market’s total surplus is missing for the period 
of delay. In contrast, effects on immediate total surplus are often relatively small because that 
total surplus is determined largely by past events – e.g. investment – that will not be altered 
much by contemporary policy settings. Goolsbee (2006, p.4) explains it as “the entire surplus 
in a market usually dwarfs a traditional DWL triangle”.15  
                                                 
15  The acronym DWL represents Dead Weight Loss the common expression for the amount by which present 
(static) surplus is below its maximum.  
  6  
There is strong empirical support for the claim that dynamic efficiency is much more 
important for economic performance than static efficiency.  For example, in his study of the 
determinants of economic growth, Solow (1957) concluded that approximately 87 percent of 
the source of economic growth in the United States in the first half of the 20th century could 
be explained by technical change, rather than by increases in capital and labour. Gilbert and 
Sunshine (1995) and Baumol (2002) argue that, while other researchers disagree about the 
exact quantitative effects of technical change on economic activity, there is general 
agreement that such effects are substantial.  Related empirical studies include those of 
Goolsbee op cit, who finds that the dynamic efficiency losses from a hypothetical tax applied 
to broadband Internet in the U.S. exceed the allocative efficiency losses by a factor of two or 
three.16 Romer (1994) compares the allocative and dynamic efficiency losses from an import 
tariff, and finds that the dynamic efficiency losses could be as much as 20 times allocative 
efficiency losses.  
The dynamic efficiency representation (1) illustrates that neglect of the future will adversely 
affect dynamic efficiency most where the market is subject to rapid technological change. In 
these markets, missing or delayed application of innovation will mean large forgone future 
total surpluses. Also in these dynamic markets there is much intrinsic uncertainty about future 
costs, products, demand and entry.17 In (1) the variance, σ , represents this uncertainty: it 
incorporates volatility in potential outcomes in relation to demand, cost and technology. It is 
larger for dynamic industries with open entry than it is for industries where there is less 
technical change and entry is restricted. It incorporates systemic risk as well as industry-
specific risk for the influence of both these may vary across industries. The variance is 
important for designing regulatory institutions because, as modern finance and regulatory 
theories, it plays a central role in agents’ decisions in uncertain economic environments.18  
Unfortunately, the key role of the variance is rarely considered in the actual design of 
regulatory institutions and in the selection of key regulatory parameters. In some regulatory 
settings, prospective technical change may be considered to adjust for changes in costs and 
                                                 
16  For the welfare cost of the regulatory induced delayed introduction of cell-phones see Hausman (2002). 
17  The variance includes volatility in demand as well as demand changes that accompany new technology. 
Both sources of demand change are uncertain and intersect with technological change and have similar 
implications for investment decision-making under uncertainty..  
18  This is the central point of Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
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products in setting prices;19 however, this is usually done without taking adequate account of 
uncertainty.  
Finance teaches that the variance will be at least as important for decision-making as the 
point estimates themselves. It needs to be considered carefully in the design of regulatory 
policy. While there may be little uncertainty about what determines present total surplus 
W0(p0,θ 0 ), there is typically much uncertainty about future components of dynamic efficiency. 
In what follows it is explained that the variance, σ , is a critical element of agents’ behaviour 
in dynamic markets. If dynamic efficiency is to be optimised, policies should be functions of 
the variance so that θ = θ (σ ) . The policy settings represented by θ  include institutional 
settings, such as the timing of reviews, and whether regulation is enforced after or before 
regulated parties have acted (i.e., ex ante or ex post regulation); The settings also include 
specific rules such as price caps. If one does not consider volatility in the choice of regulatory 
institution, the benefits of using incentive regulation will be overstated. 
2.2 Alternative Approaches to Regulating Dynamic Markets 
The broad forms of regulation we consider are antitrust and industry-specific regulation, 
where the latter subsumes cost-of service and incentive regulation. Under industry-specific 
regulation, we will generally be concerned with price regulation that is applied to limit 
natural monopoly powers.20   
The impact of technological change on dynamic efficiency in antitrust and industry-specific 
regulation is affected by the difference in philosophy of the two approaches. It is also affected 
by the economic modelling used under the two policy approaches. Technological change is 
important for both regulatory forms, in part because rapid technological change reduces the 
number of firms that are required, all else equal, for a workably competitive market. 
2.2.1 The importance of understanding workably competitive markets  
The definition of a workably competitive market will affect how we define optimal decisions 
for the firm and the regulator. It is not commonly understood that a workably competitive 
                                                 
19  For example, in some jurisdictions account is taken of technical change by allowing accelerated 
depreciation of assets by a calculation known as “tilted annuity”. This approach assumes a path of cost 
reductions, but does not consider uncertainty in the path.  
20  We do not consider political economy explanations of regulatory institutions that, for example, are 
proposed by Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976). Nor do we consider papers such as Lewis and Sappington 
(1988) that explicitly address the setting of regulatory parameters when the firm holds more information 
than the regulator. 
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market must enable decision-making under uncertainty, where, for example, firms can benefit 
from delaying decisions and observing how key uncertainties get resolved. Modelling such 
decision-making under uncertainty allows for a sharper comparison of various regulatory 
institutions. 
A workably competitive market is the basic environment of antitrust regulation. It may be 
defined as:21  
            “….. a market framework in which the pressures of other participants (or the 
 existence of potential new entrants) is sufficient to ensure that each participant is 
 constrained to  act efficiently and in its planning to take account of those other 
 participants or likely  entrants as unknown quantities.  To that end there must be an 
 opportunity for each participant or new entrant to achieve an equal footing with the 
 efficient participants in the market by having equivalent access to the means of entry, 
 sources of supply, outlets for product, information, expertise and finance.”  
It is a market that is taken to have no market power issues under antitrust law, and it is the 
practical representation of theoretical constructs that allow for various kinds of rivalry among 
firms. According to Markham (1950), workable competition is not some minor relaxation of 
perfect competition, but should enable dynamic efficiency. As such it must admit inter-
temporal decision-making by participants under risk and uncertainty and irreversible 
investment.22 
Modern investment decision-making processes can be usefully modelled by explicitly 
considering investment decision alternatives. These include options to choose the timing of 
investment as well as the nature and size of projects. These models enable the desired timing 
of investment to be incorporated in decisions, and thus for decisions to reflect the benefit of 
information acquired by waiting before investing.23   
 
Novy-Marx (2007) demonstrates that for many investments delay options are present in 
workable competition.24 Novy-Marx (op cit, 1462) states 
                                                 
21  Heydon (1989, p.1548) Trade Practices Law.  
22  Irreversible investments are typical and not special to networks with substantial physical infrastructure. 
Examples include advertising, product differentiation and development investment.  
23  Dixit and Pindyck op cit provide a comprehensive discussion of the place of real options in inter-temporal 
decision-making. 
24  Put another way, delay options would be recognized and affect the decisions of a social planner.  
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“The analysis presented in this article shows that in a competitive industry firms can 
actually appear to deviate more from neoclassical behavior than the standard real  
options analysis predicts. In particular, firms may invest only at significantly positive  
option premia, and delay irreversible investment longer than predicted by a standard, 
partial-equilibrium model calibrated to the observed price data.”  
 
Uncertainty, irreversible investment and heterogeneity of firms combine to generate this 
result. Workably competitive markets have sufficient competition that rents due to near 
monopoly positions are eliminated, but investment options and associated premia remain.25 In 
these markets, prices and quantities reflect the creation and extinction of real options by 
decision-makers. By way of illustration, standard application of investment models cannot 
explain the persistent presence of an empty lot in a thriving downtown city: the standard net 
present value criterion would be to assess if building is profitable and, if so, build 
immediately. Waiting to assess evolving opportunity costs resulting from demand and supply 
conditions is typically superior for building and, in workably competitive settings, for 
dynamic efficiency.26  
There has been significant growth in modelling applications of the options-decision approach 
because it offers the possibility of empirical models that better match decision-making under 
uncertainty when there is irreversible investment.27 Further, it provides a reasonably tractable 
way of modelling flexible inter-temporal decision-making so that institutional settings and 
theories can be explored systematically in a dynamic setting. But its importance lies in the 
finding that even in workably competitive markets the desirability of waiting to make 
irreversible investments increases with uncertainty or risk. This is a consequence of the bad 
news principle (Bernanke (1983)) where there is a waiting option. This principle provides 
that of the two forms of error--waiting when the investment turns out to be profitable; and 
investing when the investment turns out to be unprofitable--it is the latter that is more costly 
where there is the opportunity to delay. An increase in uncertainty – in models measured as 
                                                 
25  Novy-Marx (2007, 1462) discusses particular situations where the option premia are small. They are 
situations where investment has no economies or dis-economies and no lump sum elements. 
26    This example is discussed by Novy-Marx op cit, but originates from Titman (1985). While real estate is a 
      very competitive industry owners often do not to build on property that could be immediately developed   
      profitably. The option to develop in the future is valuable and reflected in decisions about the timing of  
      development. It illustrates that options exist in workably competitive markets in part because even in a  
      competitive market individuals hold monopoly positions on their intra-firm decisions. 
27  See, for example, Pindyck (1991). 
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an increase in the variance –increases the desirability of delay because it pays to be relatively 
more cautious in situations of high variance of potential returns.  
Markets that are dynamically changing add more uncertainty about future costs and products 
than markets that are relatively stable. It follows that the timing of dynamically efficient 
investment in workably competitive markets will demand more flexibility for delay and 
higher premia for investment thresholds when there is more rapid technological change.  
The ability of firms to take actions as uncertainty unfolds increases dynamic efficiency.28 
Rules that limit the actions of the regulated firm to respond to changing circumstances will 
inhibit dynamic efficiency: such rules may be product-specific price caps and rigid quality of 
performance measures. The improved management of risk associated with more flexibility, 
and lower transactions costs associated with firm decision making, will enhance dynamic 
efficiency.  
2.2.2 Antitrust or Industry-Specific Regulation? 
The speed of technical change has implications for the desirable form of regulation of 
dynamic markets.  While there is some overlap, we adopt the broad classification that 
antitrust regulation seeks to affect the competitive behaviour of market participants by 
examining and ruling on behaviour ex post; in contrast, industry-specific regulation tries to 
define appropriate outcomes ex ante and seeks to implement these outcomes by means of 
ongoing rule setting and monitoring.29 Antitrust regulation has the general task of 
maintaining workable competition, whereas industry-specific regulation tries to produce 
outcomes that mimic workable competition in situations where it is deemed infeasible for 
workable competition to thrive.  
                                                 
28  One manifestation of the benefits of such flexibility is provided by the arguments for liquid markets: see the 
finance text of Lengwiler (2004, s.6.2) on the dynamic finance economy. The ability to frequently 
(desirably continuously) trade assets substitutes for the absence of complete markets: in these there is one 
market for each state of the world, which is the financial economists’ representation of perfect competition 
in the presence of uncertainty. In particular settings, frequent low-cost actions or trades allow the 
consumers’ portfolios to adjust quickly to new information (outcomes of technological change) and thereby 
enable the consumer welfare that would exist in complete markets even with markets that are much fewer. 
Even if complete markets are not attained, quasi-complete markets may arise from active response over 
time to the arrival of new information, which have the potentiality of improving efficiency.   
29  Spulber (1989, p.624) makes a similar distinction.  He states that regulation “refers to general rules and 
specific actions imposed by administrative agencies on consumers, firms, and the market allocation 
mechanism…By contrast, antitrust is generally viewed as action by the antitrust agencies and the courts to 
promote competition through enforcement of antitrust law”.  Geradin and Sidak (2005) also make the 
distinction between ex ante regulation and ex post antitrust. Newbery (2005) also makes this distinction in 
his analysis of competition law and industry specific regulation, that focusses on electricity markets. 
  11  
When competition is dynamic and materially affected by technological change, there is a 
fundamental distinction between regulating ex ante for outcomes and regulating ex post to 
maintain workable competition. The distinction exists when technology is relatively stable, 
but it is more evident with dynamic markets. Antitrust law and industry-specific regulation 
represent polar cases.  Antitrust involves ex post application and enforcement of the law, and 
is about maintaining/enhancing the process of competition. It is concerned about competitive 
behaviour.  In contrast, industry-specific regulation involves ex ante intervention and seeks a 
particular outcome (e.g. normal profits, particular indicators of competition, a specific tariff 
structure).  Accordingly, while the focus of regulation is more on outcomes, the focus of 
antitrust is on enhancement of the competitive process. This distinction is particularly stark 
for dynamically changing markets. In a dynamic market, industry-specific regulation, by 
setting expectations for particular outcomes and specific rules or prices ex ante, risks 
regulatory settings that quickly become inconsistent with the way the market and competition 
would desirably evolve. In such cases, there may be significant efficiency losses. 
Carlton and Picker (2007) identify the relative advantages and disadvantages of antitrust and 
regulation, offering a similar perspective to the one provided here. One advantage of 
regulation is that it can specify prices and rules for how firms should deal with each other; on 
the other hand it is likely to produce cross-subsidies and favor particular interest groups. The 
authors contrast this instrument with antitrust, which they suggest has the advantage that it 
promotes competition and avoids favoring special interests.  It is not good, however, at 
formulating or enforcing rules, such as setting prices.  
Another potential drawback with industry-specific regulation for dynamic efficiency is that it 
monitors and adjusts regulatory settings ex post as well as ex ante. Industry-specific 
regulatory actions taking place ex post to enforce views about desirable outcomes is a 
significant difference from antitrust, and one that detracts from the ability of industry-specific 
regulation to mimic a workably competitive market.  
An important difference between ex ante rules and ex post behavioural limits is that the latter 
will tend to provide firms with more flexibility, which is likely to enhance welfare—
especially in dynamic markets. The key to this result is that firms (and consumers) can 
benefit when they have the ability to react quickly and at low cost to the arrival of new 
information on markets. Because antitrust regulation is limited in its ex ante rule making and 
generally relies on ex post intervention about market behaviour, it will generally promote 
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dynamic efficiency more than will industry-specific regulation, particularly in markets where 
there is significant technological change. 
2.2.3 Static and Dynamic Regulation: Lessons 
Static Approach: Traditional forms of regulation employ static models, which often lead to 
decisions that sacrifice dynamic efficiency. Prior to 1984, rate of return regulation was the 
dominant approach to the regulation of public utilities in the US.30  In the past 30 years, 
incentive regulation has been introduced often with the objective of mimicking workably 
competitive markets by setting prices to reflect the ongoing efficient costs of providing 
services: prices which are no higher than a firm would expect in a competitive market. 
Effective rate of return regulation is most plausible when entry is prevented and technology is 
changing slowly; in contrast incentive regulation can co-exist with entry and new 
technologies. 
Rate of return regulation specifies the regulated firm’s rates in such a way that revenues 
cover an estimate of the firm’s variable and fixed costs, where the latter reflects an allowable 
rate of return on the firm’s rate base.31  In order to account for capital costs inter-temporal 
models are employed that use the weighted average cost of capital and an estimate of the 
capital stock. But these approaches generally do not explicitly include models of decision-
making under risk where there are irreversible investments.32  Estimation of variable costs 
and the cost of the rate base generally rely on historical costs. While such estimates may 
incorporate specific, forward-looking adjustments for inflation or fuel costs (Joskow and 
Noll, 1991), the approach is largely static.  Spulber (1989) reports that estimation of variable 
costs from past operating expenses does not take account of possible future changes in 
relative prices, output, consumer demand and demand elasticity. Alleman (1999) finds 
telecommunications cost models have “fundamental methodological flaws” that include no 
reflection of dynamics, no allowance for changes in demand or factor prices over time, and 
no accounting for risk and sunk investments.  It shows that incorporating real options can 
make a significant difference in the estimated regulated price. Using a simple comparison of 
a real options model with a traditional cost model, the analysis shows that a traditional model 
may underestimate the regulated price by as much as 60%. 
                                                 
30  Littlechild (2003). 
31  See Spulber (1989), p. 269-279 for a more detailed outline of the process of rate of return regulation. 
32  The weighted average cost of capital is itself a static concept.  
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Static economic models embody a-temporal decision-making and, while they may be 
informative about immediate total surplus, W0(p0,θ0), they are seldom useful in forecasting 
outcomes in dynamic markets. However, where they provide qualitative lessons for total 
surplus that is applicable for every period’s total surplus, static models may make a useful 
contribution to regulating in a dynamically efficient manner. An example is the static theory 
of two-sided markets.33 It assumes networks are platforms that facilitate consumer-to-
consumer transactions, and recognises that certain interactions among consumer demands 
imply that cost-based pricing is not welfare enhancing. Assessing the welfare of regulated 
prices requires joint consideration of demands on both sides of the market, and of the 
potential for waterbed effects -- whereby constraining prices through regulation on one side 
of the market leads to an increase in prices on the other side of the market.34  While such a 
result is static, in the sense that it pertains to allocative efficiency in a given period, it is 
qualitatively applicable any period, and thus is relevant to dynamic efficiency.  
Dynamic Approach: Dynamic efficiency under rapid technological change requires 
considering future states of the world that are possible outcomes of a dynamic process that 
reflects decisions made under uncertainty. Dynamic models seek to achieve this by 
incorporating risk, irreversible investments, and the potential for assets losing their value as 
new technologies arrive. They generally have some element of incentive regulation present, 
in that the regulated firm controls its production and investment decisions. These models 
adopt the general structure for dynamic efficiency described in (1) and include measures of 
volatility that are critical in the performance of regulation.  
Dobbs (2004) and Evans and Guthrie (2005, 2006) are recent examples of dynamic models 
developed to address questions of regulation.  They variously use stochastic processes for 
demand and capital prices to capture the effects of dynamic technological change and seek to 
optimize dynamic efficiency incorporating decision-making that is cognizant of risk and 
irreversible investment.35 A key result of this research is that setting the price below the 
optimal level will, potentially drastically, reduce dynamic efficiency much more than setting 
it above the optimal level. The reason is that is that price caps limit the upside for the firm, 
                                                 
33  See, for example, Rochet and Tirole (2004). 
34  For an analysis of the theoretical conditions for the existence of a waterbed effect, see Schiff (2008).  
Genakos and Valletti (2009) consider empirical evidence for the existence of a waterbed effect from the 
regulation of mobile termination rates. 
35   Pindyck (2007) provides an analysis of these effects into models of telecommunications investment under 
cost-based regulation. 
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but leave the downside of payoffs from investment with the firm. Further, the optimal level of 
a price cap is higher than it would be if uncertainty were ignored in regulatory price setting, 
and it increases with uncertainty: i.e., with the variance, σ .  
This result is accentuated by economies of scale in investment.  It arises because scale 
economies add an incentive to invest in anticipation of demand in order that, at the time of 
building, more is constructed thereby lowering the per unit cost of supply. Evans and Guthrie 
(2006) find that, for demand uncertainty and minor economies of scale, incentive regulation 
that sets prices at intervals based on actual demand and at the level an efficient firm would 
require to enter the industry, would yield inordinately prices if it were to yield dynamically 
efficient behavior. This comes about because the firm making an investment decision looks 
forward, taking into account both demand uncertainty and the periodic re-setting of prices. It 
knows that at the time prices are reset, the regulator observes actual demand. If demand turns 
out to be relatively low, it will set a relatively low price. Economies of scale accentuate the 
cost of stranding induced by the price re-set, because there is an incentive for the firm to 
invest in advance on the likelihood of relatively rapid demand growth. The high prices that 
preserve efficient incentive regulation are required to compensate the firm for the resultant 
risk. This result is an important illustration of the effect of ex ante rules that are monitored ex 
post: the regulator has the benefit of hindsight, and thus information that the firm cannot have 
when it makes investment decisions 
This example illustrates that “revisiting” ex post settings made ex ante under industry specific 
incentive regulation will accentuate the risk that the firm faces and adversely affect 
investment: again because of the asymmetry. If at a re-hearing about the level of a price cap, 
demand and hence profits turn out to be higher (lower) than anticipated when the regulatory 
rules were set, the price will be lowered (left the same). Evans and Guthrie (2005) show that 
this has the effects of a) accentuating the risk of stranding investment, and b) affecting the 
systemic risk of the firm and thereby its weighted average cost of capital, where demand is 
correlated to the business cycle. Both effects imply an optimally higher price cap under 
incentive regulation. 
The timing of regulatory hearings is also a regulatory choice of particular importance in 
dynamic markets. Guthrie’s (2006) review of this issue considers the impact of the frequency 
of regulatory hearings on the regulated firm’s investment incentives.  It finds that more 
infrequent hearings can lead to more efficient investment behaviour, as a longer period 
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between hearings awards the firm a relatively higher proportion of the social benefits from 
investment, but distortions remain (as the firm has an incentive to invest immediately after a 
hearing to maximize the length of time that it enjoys the benefits).  In markets with rapid 
technological change, investment would occur more frequently than in less dynamic markets.  
Thus, the welfare benefits of efficient investment behaviour generated by more infrequent 
hearings are likely to be substantially greater in more dynamic markets. 
Evans and Guthrie (2006) find that, in the presence of irreversible investments, resetting the 
regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the regulated firm from more 
frequent exposure to demand and technology shocks.  Such shocks are likely to be a more 
common occurrence in dynamically changing markets, and thus the risks will be higher for 
regulated firms in these markets.  The result is that shortening review periods of fixed length 
accentuates the asymmetric effect on the regulated firm: on the downside, more frequent 
review periods expose the firm to more risk, but there is no counteracting upside opportunity 
in comparison to less frequent review periods. 
Ultimately, it may be that the optimal timing of regulatory hearings in a dynamic market may 
be no fixed review period.  Reviews could instead be considered endogenous, with review 
dates determined by evolving problems.36  Guthrie (2006, 935) reports that the efficacy of 
this approach will depend upon the activism of the consumers. If these were active and 
sought to enforce expectations of outcomes such as level of profits) there may be no gain in 
security of investment for the firm.  
2.3 Implications for the Form of Regulation 
The preceding analysis suggest that the ability of firms to act as information arrives enhances 
dynamic efficiency; and that is particularly true in circumstances where the variability of 
prospective outcomes is high, as in industries undergoing rapid technological change. We 
summarize key findings below for industry specific ex ante regulation:  
Prices should be set higher than the level static models would suggest;  
Other things constant, regulated prices should be set higher when there is more scope 
for error in rule setting; 
                                                 
36  Guthrie (2006) notes that under rate of return regulation the timing of hearings was determined 
endogenously by the evolution of the regulated firm’s profitability. 
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Ongoing monitoring against target outcomes can induce additional uncertainty for the 
firm and be very costly to dynamic efficiency,37 particularly with economies of scale 
in irreversible investment (which is common);  
In situations of high uncertainty, it is less likely that ex ante regulation with fixed 
length review periods is superior to regulation that is ex post. In the latter approach, 
reviews are instigated by materially changed circumstances.  
These findings imply that industry-specific regulation in its textbook form is unlikely to 
compatible with dynamic efficiency. It may explain why there has been much criticism of the 
cost-based telecommunications measure of long run incremental cost (TELRIC) calculations 
and their effects, as well as of the cost-based pricing of a firm as a whole (ODV regulation).38 
These pricing methods sought forward looking pricing rules: TELRIC for the pricing of 
connection and universal service, and ODV regulation for pricing a firm as a whole. As a 
matter of practice, regulatory prices are now very often based upon historical cost instead of a 
forward looking cost estimate, perhaps using ODV as a starting point where historical cost is 
not available. 
The limitations of industry-specific incentive regulation as initially promulgated are real. 
Regulation by government ownership and cost-of-service regulation also have limitations, 
and some compromise approach is often the outcome. Littlechild (2006)39 also questions the 
ability of industry-specific regulation to mimic workable competition. It goes on to examine a 
model of “trilateral governance” where the regulator is the third party overseeing bilateral 
bargaining between the firm and representatives of its customers in the context of an ongoing 
relational contract about services, prices and investments.40  A relational contract depends for 
its credibility on the ongoing relationship between supply-side and demand-side parties, and 
not on specific details. As such it could be expected to have fewer forward-looking fixed 
                                                 
37     Alleman and Rappoport (2002) discuss the constraints imposed by regulation on the ability of a firm to 
exercise its real options e.g., universal service provisions limiting the firm’s flexibility to exercise its option 
to delay rollout to an unprofitable customer, or to abandon provision of the service.  In its model these 
regulatory constraints have a significant cost.  
38  Hausman (1997) argues that telecommunications long run incremental costs (TELRIC) should include the 
cost of potential stranding, but that this was not admitted under FCC regulation. Optimised deprival value 
(ODV) regulation may be described as applying the TELRIC approach to the regulated firm as a whole. It 
was advocated for regulation of electricity and gas-pipe lines by the New Zealand Commerce Commission 
in the period 2001-2007 but has not been implemented. 
39  Address “Beyond Regulation” ESNIE, The European School on New Institutional Economics (accessed 3 
January 2010 at http://esnie.u-paris10.fr/en/archives/index.php?req=101) 
40  For a review of the nature of relational contracts see Milgrom and Roberts, (1992, at 131-132). 
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rules than incentive regulation. Such a contract, particularly when there is a single party (the 
regulated firm) on one side and many parties (customers) on the other side, could be expected 
to have “trilateral governance” with the regulator as the third party.41  Clearly, such an 
institutional setting will have many variations and, indeed, might well span the range from 
cost-of-service to incentive regulation.42 
In summary, when there is rapid technical change neither cost-of-service regulation nor 
incentive regulation are per se superior in enhancing dynamic efficiency.  In both cases 
uncertainty associated with demand and supply render the achievement of dynamic efficiency 
by means of industry-specific regulation problematic. If there is one lesson, it is that industry-
specific regulation adversely affects dynamic efficiency.  The relational contract approach 
may entail fewer rigid rules, but may not operate well in all settings. 
The preceding discussion about the value of antitrust in an industry subject to rapid 
technological change sidesteps an important question: how does a decision maker know 
before the fact whether an industry is likely to be subject to rapid technological change? 
While we do not give a full response to that question here, suffice it to note that even if a 
decision maker cannot make this judgment, antitrust is still likely to be preferable to industry-
specific regulation because we believe the net expected benefits are likely to be higher. That 
is, there is relatively little downside in selecting antitrust in the case where industry-specific 
regulation is optimal; in contrast, there could be significant losses in choosing industry-
specific regulation if antitrust were optimal (i.e., in the case of a dynamically changing 
market such as the market for mobile phone services). 
These findings suggest that antitrust regulation should be a serious alternative. It has the 
significant advantage of not defining specific, outcome oriented rules in advance and thereby 
preserving flexibility for the firm. They also suggest that industry-specific regulation should 
be used sparingly – and with minimal ex ante outcome-oriented rule setting: only in 
circumstances where total surplus cannot be expected to change much over time as a 
consequence of technical change or fluctuations in demand should industry specific 
regulation be preferred.  
                                                 
41  Trilateral governance, as explained by Williamson (1979, 233-261, at 249-250) is a situation where it saves 
transactions costs for an agency – in this case the government – to act as the arbitrator to an ongoing 
contract that may have idiosyncratic features. 
42  Vertical integration is an extreme version of the relational approach. 
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In general it will not be possible for industry-specific regulation to closely mimic workable 
competition. For the reasons given, this form of regulation limits entry and/or reduces 
flexibility for firms to take voluntary actions; in particular, to invest or respond to 
competition.  Antitrust regulation is the only form of regulation that is consistent with 
workable competition.43 This strengthens the argument that industry-specific regulation 
should be very selectively applied.    
3 Application of Regulation in Telecommunications 
In this section we provide an empirical examination of telecommunications regulation to gain 
insights into the effectiveness and efficiency of various regulatory regimes. We consider the 
approaches of the US, UK and EU, the application of antitrust regulation in New Zealand, the 
effect of imposing the EU telecommunications model in Finland, and the link between 
telecommunications development and regulation in developing economies. 
3.1 US, UK and European Union Telecommunications Regulation  
A few key features of industry-specific regulation have served as the basis of 
telecommunications regulation in many countries, such as the USA, UK and EU.  They 
include the static natural monopoly model of regulation, the cross subsidisation of some 
consumers, and access regulation.   
The basis for industry-specific price control regulation has long been the static natural 
monopoly model. In the basic model, economies of scale enable a single firm to supply the 
entire market at a lower average cost than two or more firms.  Telecommunications networks 
were typically thought to be natural monopolies on the basis of their high fixed (and sunk) 
costs of establishing the network and the low marginal costs of carrying calls. Because 
entrants would have difficulty entering the market, the incumbent would price above average 
cost; thus, providing a rationale for regulation.44 This static theory has not been translated 
into a dynamic counterpart, although it is implicit in the general approach of (1) utilized by 
Dobbs op cit and others.  
                                                 
43  Notwithstanding access regulation is a form of industry-specific regulation that is designed to foster 
competition.   
44  This reasoning does not explain why entry should be prevented by regulation; unless it is that 
telecommunications is assumed to be a non-sustainable natural monopoly (Waterson (1978,63)), which 
requires at some level diseconomies of scale. 
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It is not clear, however, whether telecommunications networks should have been 
approximated by the static natural monopoly model. Economides (1998) reports that as early 
as 1900 in the U.S., telecommunications firms competed prior to their absorption into the 
Bell System.  Using data from 1976 to 1983 to estimate cost functions, Shin and Yang (1992) 
estimate that prior to the divestiture, AT&T was not a natural monopoly.  Recently, 
technological change and accompanying demand expansion in telecommunications have 
made these networks anything but natural monopolies.  New technologies have emerged that 
allow intermodal competition with legacy copper networks for the provision of voice 
services, as well as a wide range of data services.  These cellular, wireless, satellite and cable 
technologies have transformed the industry from (an arguable) natural monopoly into one of 
dynamic oligopoly.   
Regulation based on the model of natural monopoly is not consistent with the current state of 
the industry.  Neither was it an appropriate basis for regulation in the 1990s.45  At that time, 
new technologies that provide intermodal competition were well developed and operational, 
and any reasonable forward-looking analysis would have expected these technologies to be 
potential competitive alternatives to the fixed-wire voice network.46 
The second key feature of the regulatory template of the US, UK and EU is access regulation.  
Actual and potential facilities competition over the past 20 years has reduced the rationale for 
natural monopoly regulation. Yet, there has been an upsurge in access regulation.  Opening 
telecommunications networks to competitors through, for example, mandatory unbundling of 
local loops, is typically justified on the basis of yielding efficiency improvements arising 
from increases in the number of competitors and concomitant lower prices.  This rationale, 
however, is static. It heavily weights immediate total surplus. In dynamic economic 
environments, mandatory access can undermine the investment incentives of both incumbents 
and entrants, lowering future total surpluses and thereby reducing dynamic efficiency.  
Mandatory access at cost-based access prices has the same implications as TELRIC and ODV 
pricing. It also grants the access seeker a “free option.” The access seeker can use the 
incumbent’s network in favourable conditions, but will not access it if conditions are 
unfavourable.47  As a result, the incumbent is under-compensated under cost-based access. It 
bears the entire cost of unfavourable conditions, but shares the benefits during favourable 
                                                 
45  See Spulber (1995), noting that, at that time, the natural monopoly argument was often raised as a 
justification for maintaining regional restrictions on local exchange carriers in the U.S. 
46  See the analysis of Spulber (1995). 
47  Pindyck (2007). 
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conditions.  Hausman (2000) and Pindyck (2007) argue that this deters investment because 
the incumbent does not expect to be fully compensated for the risk arising from uncertainty. 
Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000) find that this also decreases incentives for the access seeker to 
invest in its own new network.  
Grajek and Röller (2009) estimate the effects of access regulation on investment using a 
dataset covering more than 70 fixed-line telecommunications operators in 20 EU member 
states over the period 1997-2006.  It estimates how “regulatory intensity” impacts on 
investment of fixed-line operators, where regulatory intensity is measured by various indices 
related to access regulation.48  It finds that increases in regulatory intensity reduce investment 
by both incumbents and individual entrants, although entrants’ total investment increases.  
Grajek and Röller estimate that reduced infrastructure investment attributable to  access 
regulation in the EU was €16.4 billion over the 1997-2006 period. 
Crandall, Ingraham and Singer (2004) study the impact of unbundled access regulation in the 
US on the investment incentives of access seekers.  Using US state-wide data from 2000 and 
2001, it finds that investment by access seekers in their own facilities-based networks is 
lower in states where regulated access charges are lower.  It concludes that access regulation 
decreases facilities-based competition in the short-term; a finding consistent that is consistent 
with the theoretical finding of Jorde, Sidak and Teece (2000) noted above. 
A wider study covering the US, UK, New Zealand, Canada and Germany by Hausman and 
Sidak (2005) finds similar results.  It reviews the regulated unbundling experience in each of 
these countries, focusing on key metrics such as prices and investment.  Its findings include 
that unbundling regulation led to either flat or increasing retail prices in most countries, 
contrary to the often-claimed rationale for regulation that it will increase retail competition 
and lead to lower prices.  It also finds that there was no support in any of these countries for 
the proposition that unbundling regulation would lead to greater facilities-based investment 
by access seekers.  Instead, access seekers appear to have “chased retail margins” on the 
incumbent’s unbundled network, rather than developed their own competing networks. 
The third common feature of US, UK and EU regulation is universal service obligation 
(USO), which typically involves cross subsidies. Many countries require that all users have 
                                                 
48  Specifically, the indices relate to the vertical separation, unbundling, line sharing, bitstream access, subloop 
unbundling, and regulatory asymmetry between digital subscriber line and cable. 
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access to telecommunications services at an “affordable” price.49  USOs on incumbent 
network providers are often justified on the basis of cost of service and network 
externalities.50  In the case of network externalities, the rationale is that the benefits of having 
the additional users on the network exceeds the costs of the USO cross-subsidy. 
Telecommunications markets (or at least those fixed-wire calling markets of developed 
economies typically covered by USOs) are now relatively mature, and thus the importance of 
network externalities, and any benefit-cost rationale for the USO, is diminished.  While an 
additional user on the network will remain valuable to all other existing network users, the 
incremental value is likely to be very small.  Rochet and Tirole (2004) argue that in mature 
telecommunications markets (and also payment systems) network externalities will be at the 
level of individual transactions, rather than overall decisions to join the network.  Likewise, 
Katz (2001), in considering credit card networks (although the point is also applicable to 
telecommunications) notes that as the number of users on the network reaches a sufficiently 
high level, marginal changes in users will generate smaller or no benefits to other users.  
In the context of an industry shaped by rapid technological change, the rationale for USOs is 
even less persuasive.  Technology has evolved so that new methods of communication have 
become available to those that would be considered “not commercially viable” for the 
provision of fixed line services.  Digitization of communication now means that voice calls 
can be carried over any network, and thus cellular, satellite and wireless services can provide 
alternative means by which consumers can utilize telecommunications networks.  This 
intermodal competition largely eliminates the need for a specific USO.  Rather, to the extent 
that a universal service is socially beneficial, universality is likely to evolve naturally, as 
Gillet (1994) argues: 
Therefore, the most important universal service question is now: what structural market 
and technology guidelines will allow “universal interconnect” so that anyone can get to 
any service—new or old, essential or frivolous—from anywhere?  Establishing and 
following such guidelines creates a process by which multiple worthwhile services can 
become ubiquitous without requiring separate government involvement in each case—
much as the U.S. antitrust laws establish a framework for competitive markets that 
sustains itself without day-to-day government intervention. 
                                                 
49  Crandall and Waverman (2000). 
50  Ibid. 
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We discuss below some examples of emerging economies using new technology that has 
provided ubiquitous telecommunications services without a USO requirement.  
The rationale for universal service is a static one, but its implementation has dynamic costs. 
The cross subsidy lowers the incentive for competition for the consumers that are taxed under 
the USO, though this depends upon the source of the subsidy. Furthermore, by instituting a 
low price for those that receive the subsidy, it reduces the incentive for investment in services 
on a commercial basis. Both of these distortions are potentially costly sources of missing 
markets that inhibit dynamic efficiency51. The first of these is discussed in Baumol (1999) 
and Armstrong (2001), among others.  When the USO cross-subsidy is funded internally by 
the incumbent, rivals have an incentive to engage in “cream skimming” by targeting the 
relatively more profitable consumers that fund the USO subsidy and ignoring the consumers 
that are subsidised under the USO. 
These characteristics of US, UK and EU telecommunications regulation illustrate that their 
template is a static one and that in dynamically changing industries it is are unlikely to foster 
dynamic efficiency.52  
3.2 Antitrust Telecommunications Regulation: New Zealand 
New Zealand telecommunications regulation has sequentially entailed government 
ownership, antitrust regulation with a universal service constraint, and industry-specific 
regulation since 2001. Most recently, this regulation has been quite intrusive. It prescribes 
organizational structures, connection arrangements, and is proposed to enable government 
competition in funding broadband.53  The New Zealand experience is of most interest for the 
10-year period in which the incumbent was investor owned and subject only to antitrust 
regulation and universal service requirements. This period of antitrust regulation was unique 
to New Zealand and it occurred in the presence of very rapid technical change. This section 
points out that there is no evidence that final consumers were disadvantaged by this regime, 
or that the industry-specific regime that followed has enhanced final consumer welfare. The 
antitrust regulatory regime spanned the period of conversion from analogue to digital 
communication and the unanticipated explosion in demand for digital communications 
                                                 
51  This point is made by Alleman and Rappoport op cit. 
52  In some countries regulation of telecommunications has moved further towards central planning. In the UK, 
Australia and New Zealand changes organizational structure of the incumbent telecommunications firm 
have been imposed and the governments of the latter two countries are financing the roll out of broadband.   
53  Howell (2008). 
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services arising from the internet. Research suggests that the rapid development and diffusion 
of new technology that occurred would not have happened had there been industry-specific 
regulation.     
Telecommunications services were provided and regulated by the Post Office as a 
government department until 1987. Then, it became a state-owned enterprise and the 
incumbent operator.  The Telecommunications Act 1987 opened the telecommunications 
market to competition without any regulatory restriction apart from competition law (the 
Commerce Act 1986). However, upon privatization in 1991 Telecom, was subjected to the 
“Kiwi Share” obligation. This required Telecom to cap residential line rental prices at the rate 
of inflation, provide universal service, and offer at least one plan without calling charges on 
local calling. The period of antitrust regulation ended in 2001 with the passing of an Act that 
established a Telecommunications Commissioner, residing in the Commerce Commission, 
with the power to make regulatory determinations.  While regulation initially focused on 
access obligations for the copper local loop, it has progressively been extended to other, more 
contestable, parts of fixed and wireless networks. It now includes unbundling of the local 
loop and operational separation of the incumbent Telecom.  
There was entry in the New Zealand telecommunications market by Clear Communications 
(Clear), partly owned by MCI, in 1991. Clear provided long distance service using alternative 
backbone infrastructure held by other infrastructure firms. Entry by Bell South in 1992 
provided a GSM mobile network in competition with the analogue and then the TDMA 
digital mobile network of Telecom. Ownership of both these entrants has varied over time. 
Over the past two decades there has been further entry in fixed line and mobile providers, 
particularly evident prior to 2000. 
Comparisons of the performance of telecommunications regimes is difficult because it is hard 
to measure all key variables that could help explain the differences, and because there are few 
observations.54 55  There was a protracted legal dispute between Clear and Telecom about 
interconnection for local service that was heard by various courts. At that time 
                                                 
54  For example, a detailed study by Alger and Leung (1999) using a TELRIC model showed that New Zealand 
costs of telecommunications service could be as much as 15% higher than that of certain other countries 
simply on the grounds of the population density and distribution. Additional differences included an 
absence of cable services that reflected New Zealand’s population density and also its history of state 
ownership and regulation of much (communications) infrastructure meant there was no possibility of 
competition until 1987. 
55  For example, in the 1990s price comparisons made by the OECD used posted prices rather that transaction 
prices that reflected quantity-discounting promotions. The difference was substantial in some cases 
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interconnection contract approaches were being debated worldwide, and there were also 
protracted disputes under prevailing regulatory regimes in the US and elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, Howell (2008) analyses some of the key implications of the move from light-
handed regulation in 1987-2001 to industry-specific regulation post-2001 in New Zealand.  It 
finds that the period of light-handed regulation brought falling prices at a rate faster than the 
OECD average, early and extensive investment in ADSL relative to the OECD, and low 
transaction costs (only two were contracts contested in the courts).  In contrast, in the 2002-
2007 period, the rate of decline in New Zealand prices slowed relative to declining prices in 
the OECD. Furthermore, giving competitors access to the local loop stalled their investment 
in fiber-optic networks.  Under industry-specific regulation, virtually every contract between 
market participants has been contested before the Telecommunications Commissioner, 
increasing the transaction costs of the regime relative to those of the light-handed period.  
During the period of antitrust regulation there was entry of infrastructure providers that 
bypassed Telecom’s networks in various ways and to various extents, and long distance 
providers that arbitraged price differentials. There was thus competition for the field as well 
as on the field, with quite positive results (Crandall (2004)). Boles de Boer, Enright and 
Evans (2000) evaluate the performance of the Australian and New Zealand market for 
internet service providers (ISPs) in 1999. At that time Australia had three times as many ISPs 
per capita, and its telecommunication incumbent’s ISP had a much lower market share than 
did the New Zealand incumbent ISP.  Despite this, average prices to consumers were 
considerably higher in Australia: in 1999 purchasing power parity terms, ranging from 8% to 
18% higher using arithmetic averages and 25% to 74% higher using weighted averages for 
different internet user groups. Boles de Boer et al (2000) suggest that the difference was 
attributable to the different regulatory environments.  In Australia, the regulatory regime used 
industry-specific regulation, where competitors (in this case ISPs) have the right of access. 
The right and the terms of access are determined by the regulator.  The access services 
included inter-city broadband transmission, which was declared available for access to 
competitors, despite the existence of both actual and potential competition.  Providing such 
access limited the incentive for bypass and facilities competition. Competition was limited to 
a static “me too” form with common charges for the platform. In contrast, there were strong 
incentives for facilities competition competition in New Zealand. Under antitrust regulation, 
ISPs there used a mix of their own and the incumbent’s network. 
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The rapid growth of the internet, universal service requirements, and competition between 
ISPs were key to a decision made by the incumbent Telecom, known as “0867” after the 
calling prefix used. This decision was challenged in higher New Zealand courts by the 
competition law authority. The decision and its aftermath illustrate the flexibility that all 
agents have under antitrust regulation to adjust to rapidly evolving technological change that 
they would not have under industry-specific regulation.  
Telecom’s decision in 1999, referred to as the “0867 action,” was to introduce a new 0867 
prefix for dial-up internet calls, and shift ISP calls to an internet protocol.  Residential 
customers dialing the 0867 number for internet calls would not be charged for those calls, 
whereas those who dialed other numbers to ISPs would be charged two cents per minute 
beyond 10 hours of internet use per month.  This created incentives for residential customers 
to join an ISP that accepted the 0867 prefix, but by doing so the ISP also had to agree that it 
would no longer claim termination revenues on dial-up internet calls.  Thus, ISPs on Clear’s 
network required Clear to reach an agreement with Telecom; otherwise, they would be 
required to move to Telecom’s network or potentially lose customers faced with the two cents 
per minute charge. The decision was allowed by the Government of the day, as overseer of 
the universal service constraint, provided Telecom maintained a free local calling option, 
which it did. The decision entailed variations of contracts, for which parties were 
compensated by Telecom.  
The 0867 action was deemed by the New Zealand High Court and Appeals Court to meet the 
test of acceptable behaviour under antitrust law, and the efficiency of the result was 
sanctioned by its inclusion in the Telecommunications Act of 2001 that established industry-
specific regulation. The Commerce Commission, however, has continued to argue before the 
courts that the action was an abuse of market power.56  Had there been industry-specific 
regulation, Telecom would likely have had limited ability to respond to changing industry 
circumstances. In particular the 0867 action, subsequently deemed efficient, could not have 
been implemented.  
The 0867 action was taken by Telecom in 1999 as the result of the rapid growth of dial-up 
internet traffic and the consequent increase in one-way call volumes (consumers “dialing” 
ISPs) that led to rapidly increasing pressure on the capacity of Telecom’s fixed network.  
This pressure was accompanied by a rapidly growing financial deficit Telecom was incurring 
                                                 
56  The Commerce Commission has appealed the Appeal Court decision to the New Zealand Supreme Court. 
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on interconnection payments. These payments were the result of an interconnection 
agreement between Telecom and Clear, finalized just before internet growth exploded. One 
party would pay the other per-minute amounts for calls terminating on the other’s network.  
Since Telecom had a relatively large number of residential customers, any ISPs that Clear 
could sign up to its network would provide large termination revenues.  The situation was not 
symmetric because Clear had only a small number of residential customers; thus, dial-up 
internet calls from these customers to ISPs on Telecom’s network would not generate large 
revenues to Telecom. In addition, Telecom was constrained by universal service obligations 
to offer a free local call option. The situation led to what the High Court subsequently 
referred to as “perverse incentives”.57  Clear could share its termination revenue with its own 
ISP customers and with other ISPs on its network, inducing ISPs to shift to Clear’s network 
and generating even higher termination revenues.  The result was that a number of ISPs on 
Clear’s network marketed free internet services subsidized by the interconnection fee, further 
increasing the termination revenue obtained by Clear, and creating congestion on Telecom’s 
network.58  
In 2000 the Commerce Commission announced that it would prosecute Telecom for the 0867 
action, and the case was heard in the High Court in 2007.  The basis of the Commission’s 
case was that Telecom had abused its dominant position by incentivising customers to use an 
ISP with an 0867 number, for which no termination charges could be claimed. The High 
Court held that Telecom’s introduction of the 0867 service was not a breach of competition 
law, as a firm in Telecom’s position in a competitive market would have profitably been able 
to introduce the 0867 service in response to the termination charge and network capacity 
issues.  The High Court also held that, by removing the “perverse incentives”, the 0867 
service could have led to dynamic efficiency gains.  The High Court’s decision was upheld 
on appeal.59 60  
The 0867 case illustrates dramatically the difference between antitrust and industry-specific 
regulation.  Were the Commerce Commission to have regulated the removal of the 0867 
                                                 
57  Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited and Anor, HC AK CIV 2000-
485-673, 18 April 2008. 
58  Detail is provided in Karel (2003). 
59  Commerce Commission v Telecom Corporation of NZ Ltd and Anor, CA CA288/2008, 4 August 2009.  
60  The Commission has appealed the Appeal Court’s decision to the Supreme Court seemingly suggesting that 
it disagrees with the test for abuse of market power being whether a dominant firm took actions it could not 
have profitably conducted were the market workably competitive. For discourse on variants of tests of 
abuse of dominance see Vickers (2005). 
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service ex ante, it would almost certainly have led to continued inefficient use of Telecom’s 
network by ISPs charging low or zero prices to consumers. Furthermore, Telecom would 
likely have been required to make additional network investments that were uneconomic.  
The telecommunications sector was changing rapidly at the time, with the move from dial-up 
internet to broadband.  Not only would regulation have distorted network investment, it 
would surely have slowed the rate of broadband take-up, as consumers would have little 
incentive to move from low-priced or free dial-up plans to broadband.  Flexibility under 
antitrust allowed the industry to evolve through technological change accompanied by 
changes in contractual positions.  In 2001 Telecom and Clear renegotiated their 
interconnection agreement on a bill-and-keep basis. Ultimately this agreement was embedded 
in industry-specific regulation with the passing of the Telecommunications Act in 2001.61 
3.3 Forcing the EU Telecommunications Model on Finland 
The evolution of telecommunications in Finland illustrates the contrast between light-handed, 
self-regulatory approaches and relatively more heavy-handed industry-specific regulation that 
is represented by the standard regulatory model of the EU.62 It also illustrates that imposing a 
common regulatory template on institutional settings that are themselves evolving in response 
to technology and associated demands may not improve static or dynamic efficiency. 
The dominant business model of Finnish telecommunications providers in the early twentieth 
century was one of consumer-owned cooperatives.  These cooperatives – of which there were 
815 by 1938 – provided local telephone services in areas in which they generally enjoyed a 
local monopoly.  The cooperative structure of these providers constituted natural monopoly 
regulation by ownership since it eliminated the incentive for excessive monopoly profits as 
these were returned to the customers.  The structure also allowed self-regulation to develop, 
wherein consumer-owners had incentives to benchmark prices and service levels of their own 
local cooperative against those of comparable co-operatives nearby.  Moreover, consumer-
owners could initiate mergers with neighboring cooperatives as a means of sanctioning the 
performance of managers and garnering the benefit of scale economies.  Mergers and 
                                                 
61  Howell (2008). 
62  This section is based on Howell and Sangekar (2008). 
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acquisitions occurring after World War 2 produced 49 firms providing local telephony 
services in 2007.63 
Over time, consolidation also led to “mega-cooperatives” with the local cooperatives as 
members.  The local cooperatives remained owned by local consumers, and continued to 
independently provide local telephony services (which ensured that competitive rivalry by 
benchmarking continued), but the mega-cooperative structure allowed the smaller firms to 
jointly undertake activities such as determining interconnection agreements and setting 
uniform industry standards.  In the late 1990s some of the mega-cooperates restructured as 
listed for-profit companies, as a means of providing capital for investment in new 
technologies.  Cooperatives remained – e.g., Finnet – but their membership base of local 
cooperatives was substantially reduced. 
The cooperative structure of the industry facilitated the development of a self-regulatory 
framework. This is illustrated by arrangements for fixed network termination charges for 
mobile phones.  In 1994 the mobile operators agreed to an arrangement where the originating 
network charged a local calling charge covering both origination and termination of fixed and 
mobile calls termination charges that were independent of the operator’s costs were also set, 
at a level about half the calling charge.  The revenue obtained from the calling charge was 
used to pay termination charges.  This approach was essentially self-regulatory, since the 
calling charge placed a cap on the termination charge. 
The approach taken by the Finnish mobile operators did not comply with European Union 
requirements.  The EU required termination charges to be set based on costs, and included in 
calling charges where applicable. Howell and Sangekar (2008) argue that meeting these 
requirements removed the self-regulatory features from the previously agreed approach,  
forcing co-operative members to become commercial opponents in interconnection.  It also 
required additional regulation to set cost-based termination rates, and accordingly imposed 
significant transaction costs on firms.  Howell and Sangekar (2008, p.27-28) state that “[t]he 
EU arrangements appear to penalise the Finnet companies for their federated structure 
without considering the benefits of benchmark competition that are not available in markets 
where a single large firm dominates”.  The result was immediate increases in interconnection 
                                                 
63  It is well-known that cooperative organizations perform best when the service they provide is homogeneous 
(Hansmann (1996)). Telecommunications services are generally measurable and relatively homogenous. 
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rates and pass-through into retail charges, in some cases more than doubling the previous 
charges. 
The Finnish experience of adopting the EU regulatory model highlights two important 
lessons.  First, “one-size fits all” models of regulation are not always efficient, as they neglect 
to take into account the particular features of different markets and the regulatory governance 
structures that have evolved through time, which may be relatively efficient.64  Indeed it is 
the basis of the new institutional economics65 that institutions evolve through time generally 
efficiently--reflecting the institutional state of the market the structure of the economy, 
transactions costs and technological change. This point does not appear to be widely accepted 
by government policy analysts or regulators. A standard model of cost-based regulation of 
mobile termination rates has been implemented in a number of countries in recent years.66 
This general approach includes forward-looking rule setting—an approach that has 
problematic outcomes in dynamic markets.  
Second, the change in prices resulting from the imposition of the EU model illustrates that 
cost-of service industry-specific regulation can often lead to higher prices and be detrimental 
to economic welfare, relative to less rule-bound approaches that rely on self-regulation or 
antitrust to constrain anticompetitive behavior.  The result of higher prices from regulation is 
consistent with Hausman’s (2002) finding that regulated mobile prices in the U.S. were 
higher than unregulated prices.  It finds that regulated states had prices that were 
approximately 15% higher than unregulated states. When deregulation occurred, prices were 
not significantly different across states.  The key implication is that regulation by antitrust 
alone may yield lower prices, and thus considerably greater consumer benefits, than those 
achieved by more rule-bound regulatory approaches. 
3.4  Telecommunications Regulation in Other Economies 
Other markets have had telecommunications regulatory structures that range from negligible 
regulation – including no antitrust law – to regulation by means of government ownership. In 
this section we discuss some of these variations and the consumer welfare impacts.  Our 
focus is on mobile telephony because, as we shall see, it has had a particularly substantial 
                                                 
64  The Finnish cooperative governance model might be interpreted as a form of the trilateral governance 
regulatory model. 
65  See for example, North (1990). 
66  Including most countries in the EU, Israel, South Korea, Malaysia, Peru, Australia and New Zealand (Albon 
and York, 2006). 
  30  
impact on welfare in emerging economies. In some cases, it has leap-frogged the provision of 
ubiquitous fixed wire service. The welfare impacts of mobile go well beyond substitution for 
fixed wire services, because mobile enables significantly reduced transactions costs that 
include timely communication and multi-tasking even for the same services.67 
The growth of mobile telephones in emerging economies has been rapid; in many countries, 
penetration quickly surpassed that of fixed-wire telephony.  Waverman, Meschi and Fuss 
(2005) present data on fixed and mobile penetration rates in 102 emerging countries.  They 
show that in 1995, after many years of investment in fixed line networks, the average 
penetration rate was 2.5 percent, rising to 5 percent by 2003.  In contrast, mobile penetration 
was zero in all the countries surveyed in 1995, but had risen to an average of 8 percent in 
2003, with 22 countries reaching double digit mobile penetration and 7 having at least 25 
percent mobile penetration by this year.  Waverman et al (2005) attribute this to cost 
advantages and faster rollout for mobile relative to fixed telephone networks; but it also likely 
reflects the wider benefits of cell phones. 
Waverman et al (2005) and Qiang (2009) report that there has been a positive association 
between per capita GDP growth and mobile phone penetration that is significantly larger for 
developing countries than developed countries.  We accept Faulhaber’s (2009) comment that 
it is very difficult to obtain definitive estimates of this association.  Nonetheless, given the 
low penetration rates of fixed wire telephony in many developing economies we believe there 
will be very substantial welfare benefits from penetration of mobile telephones in emerging 
economies.  Mobile phones have provided significant benefits to emerging economies not 
just because of the mobility they provide, which is a benefit in common with developed 
countries, but also by providing basic communication services in the absence of fixed wire 
telephony.68  In emerging economies communication in isolated rural areas in these countries 
has traditionally been through walking to the nearby village, but the mobile phone has 
revolutionized this situation.69  
Mobile telephones also generate significant value-added in emerging economies because they 
provide other services that are sometimes provided by completely different means in 
developed countries. Rapid technological change has led to a depth of services, particularly in 
                                                 
67  Hausman (1997) estimates that the consumer surplus from the introduction of mobile phone services in the 
U.S. was a substantial U.S.$50 billion per year. 
68  Faulhaber (2009). 
69  Ibid. 
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mobile telecommunications, that is unlike anything available on fixed wire.  Services such as 
mobile email and mobile Internet browsing are now commonplace, while mobile phone 
transaction services that include banking are increasingly being utilised, particularly in 
emerging economies.  “Mobile money” allows mobile users to credit their mobile account at 
particular retail outlets, and then transfer funds to other mobile users by way of text message, 
which can then be withdrawn by the latter at a registered retail outlet.  Mobile money 
provides a fast, cheap and safe way to transfer money.70 Faulhaber (2009) states that mobile 
money is occurring in countries where retail banking is “costly” and the reach of traditional 
banks is limited.  Faulhaber (2009) also provides the example of “telemedicine” in Africa, 
where mobile phones are used to share medical records and other health information among 
relatively remote locations. 
Given the significant benefits to be achieved by consumers from the introduction and rapid 
diffusion of mobile phones in emerging economies, the costs of delay in that introduction 
and/or diffusion are likely to be substantial.  As noted earlier, Hausman (1997) has found 
substantial costs of delay in introducing mobile phones in the U.S. in the early 1980s.  At that 
time, there was near universal penetration of fixed telephones, and the mobiles that were 
introduced were relatively limited in the services they could provide.  It follows that delay in 
emerging economies today would likely generate even greater consumer welfare losses, as 
pre-existing communications networks are far from ubiquitous and mobile phones now offer 
a wide range of services.   
Faulhaber (2009) argues that dynamic efficiency in emerging economies will be fostered by 
light-handed regulation.71  Such regulation will allow technology to emerge and diffuse 
relatively rapidly, with benefits for consumers.  Galpaya and Samarajiva (2009) support a 
relatively light-handed approach to regulation.  Its survey of stakeholder perceptions about 
the telecommunications regulatory environment in emerging economies 72 finds that in 
Pakistan, stakeholders are highly satisfied with mobile market entry, the allocation of mobile 
spectrum and the regulation of interconnection charges.  They attribute this to Pakistan 
having a licensing regime with little regulatory risk, an expeditious process for allocating 
                                                 
70  At the same time, it provides a safer way of saving for those in developing economies, where often the only 
alternatives are corrupt savings schemes or cash “under the mattress” ( “The Power of Money”, The 
Economist, 24 September 2009). 
71  Faulhaber (2009) reaches a similar conclusion. 
72 The survey was conducted in 2006 and 2008 in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Philippines, 
Maldives, Bangladesh and Thailand. 
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spectrum, and a process of negotiated interconnection rates.  In contrast, India is perceived to 
be a poor performer in spectrum allocation, due to its highly administrative approach, while 
Thailand is considered unsatisfactory in interconnection regulation, due to “conflicting rules 
and regulations”.  India is found to be the best performer in tariff regulation, as tariffs are not 
regulated but left to market forces. This has led to some of the lowest tariffs in the world.  
The Galpaya and Samarajiva op cit analysis indicates that more highly regulated 
environments are likely to be perceived more poorly by stakeholders, which could produce 
inferior outcomes for consumers. 
4 Conclusion  
A key question facing regulators is how to create an economic environment that encourages 
appropriate investment and innovation. In this paper we analyzed the importance of 
technological change for both competition and regulation, with a particular focus on the 
regulation of telecommunications and the Internet. We suggested that technological change is 
an important part of competition. 
We recommended that dynamic efficiency should be used as the appropriate benchmark for 
judging the effectiveness of different regulatory approaches. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, we found that incentive regulation, such as price caps, is not particularly good at 
promoting dynamic efficiency. Neither is traditional cost-of-service regulation. As an 
alternative, we suggested that antitrust, judiciously applied, is likely to be better at promoting 
dynamic efficiency.  
Antitrust is particularly desirable in industries that are likely to be subject to rapid 
technological change. If such industries are hard to identify for decision makers before the 
fact, we would suggest erring on the side of using more antitrust and less industry-specific 
regulation. We believe there is relatively little downside in selecting antitrust in the case 
where industry-specific regulation is optimal; in contrast, there could be significant losses in 
choosing industry-specific regulation if antitrust were optimal. 
Our findings rely heavily on recent work in finance that has been applied to regulation. In 
addition they rely on a case study of regulation of telecommunications and the Internet in 
different regions throughout the world. A review of recent research in selected countries 
suggests that antitrust may be better for promoting dynamic efficiency than industry-specific 
regulation. 
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Future areas for research would include a more careful assessment of different regulatory 
regimes in a number of different areas, such as transportation and energy. Furthermore, the 
theoretical modeling could benefit from a more rigorous consideration of how competition 
and technological change interact in different regulatory environments.  
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Appendix: Technical Change in Telecommunications Is Continuing 
In the last 40 years the telecommunications industry has been fundamentally and rapidly 
reshaped as a result of technological change.  As recently as the 1990s it was dominated by 
analogue voice services over the fixed PSTN.  This network was vertically integrated with 
the services provided, and competition was of the form of static “me too” access competition, 
often facilitated by access regulation. 
The shift from this, relatively static, structure of the industry has been significant.  Today 
telecommunications services are digitized and provided over a range of technologies, 
including mobile, satellite, cable and the Internet. Moreover, voice communication over these 
networks is complemented by non-voice communication over mobile networks (e.g., short-
message-services and multimedia-message-services) and the Internet (email, and other 
internet-based communication such as instant messaging).  The quantum of information that 
can be transferred over telecommunications networks is substantial, with vast amounts of 
data able to be transferred around the world over short periods of time: in many cases 
instantaneously.  
Competition now occurs across a wide range of dimensions.  For example, in mobile 
telephony, competition occurs across (but is not limited to) network technology, geographic 
coverage and roaming.  Evidence of competition in network technology is shown by the 
range of different cellular technologies, and the different global rates of diffusion.  Gruber 
(2005) identifies seven different analogue 1G technologies, three of which became the most 
widespread (NMT, AMPS and TACS), and four different 2G technologies, where GSM has 
been the preferred system relative to competing JDC, DAMPS and CDMA technologies.  
Similarly, competition occurs to increase the extent of national geographic coverage and 
international roaming coverage.  For example, Valletti (2003) points to evidence of operators 
in the U.S., U.K. and Germany competing to provide full population coverage. 
Modern telecommunications services have also become separated from the network itself.  
Under present systems, many service providers contract directly with consumers, with no 
underlying arrangement with the network provider needed.  This is the case for internet 
content providers (e.g., Google), but also for those who provide communication over the 
internet (e.g., web-based email and VOIP). Concomitantly, since the 1990s there has been no 
real distinction in supply between local and long distance communication. 
The rapid shifts in telecommunications have been driven by dynamic technological change 
that has occurred both through the introduction of entirely new technologies, such as the 
mobile phone, and through improvements to existing technologies, such as the change from 
analogue to digital, from 2G to 3G mobile networks, and from ADSL to ADSL2 data 
communications technology.  Technological change has also been the source of 
improvements in existing services, and new services.  For example, services such as 
voicemail, caller ID and call waiting emerged for fixed voice lines in the 1970s and early 
1980s following the introduction of digitized switches.73  Improved existing services are 
illustrated by Google that did not offer any basic service that could be considered “new”, as 
internet search engines already existed at the time.  Instead, it offered an improved approach 
to searching for, and presenting, information available on the internet. 
                                                 
73  Spulber and Yoo (2008). 
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Rapid technological change appears to be showing no signs of abating.  New technologies 
continue to be developed for mobile telephony and the internet.  Mobile networks are in the 
process of transitioning to 3G technology, and in some parts of the world the technology is 
under development for fourth generation (4G) networks.74  Internet technology is also 
moving towards “very high bit-rate DSL” (VDSL) that is capable of supporting high 
bandwidth applications such as VOIP at much faster speeds than traditional ADSL.  Contrast 
this with the technology used to provide voice communication services over the PSTN which, 
according to Dalum and Villumsen (2003), evolved in a more gradual process.75 
The speed of technological change is also matched by the growth in services supported by 
this technology, with this growth being much more rapid for new telecommunications 
services (e.g., mobile) than for legacy technologies (e.g., fixed voice) and other electronic 
innovations.  Faulhaber (2009) reports that color televisions were introduced in the U.S. 
during the 1960s, and over the ensuing years grew to approximately 235 million TV sets in 
the U.S. in 2009.  Wireline telephones were invented in 1876, and by 2009 there were 
approximately 186 million wireline telephones in the U.S.  Contrast these figures with mobile 
phones, where there are approximately 263 million mobile phones currently in the U.S., and 
this growth has occurred in a period of only 20 years. 
Dynamic change has also led to a depth of services, particularly in mobile 
telecommunications, that is unlike anything available on the fixed PSTN.  Services such as 
mobile email and mobile Internet browsing are commonplace, while new services such as 
mobile banking and transactions are showing signs of increasing take-up, particularly in 
emerging economies (Faulhaber op cit). 
                                                 
74  For example, Japan’s NTT DoCoMo is aiming to introduce a 4G service in 2010 
(http://www.nttdocomo.com/technologies/future/toward/index.html). 
75  Dalum and Villumsen contrast the gradual evolution of the fixed telephone network with the more rapid 
technological changed experienced with computers.  However, the contrast is no less different between 
fixed telephony and mobile telephony. 
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